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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Cargile appeals in three cases. She appeals from the judgment entered in 
Case No. 38855 upon her conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance, specifically challenging the denial of her motion to suppress. In Case 
No. 38867 Cargile appeals from the order imposing sentence upon revocation of 
probation contending the district court abused its discretion in executing 
sentence. Finally, Cargile appeals from the judgment entered upon her plea to 
escape in Case No. 38868, asserting the sentence imposed was excessive. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Cargile was arrested and the state charged her with possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver following a traffic stop and dog search 
which yielded 20.3 grams of methamphetamine. (PSI, p.2; 38855 R., pp.34-35.) 
Cargile filed a motion to suppress what she termed an illegal extension of the 
traffic stop. (38855 R., pp.53-62.) Following a hearing, the motion to suppress 
was denied. (38855 R., pp.101-102.) The motion to suppress was originally 
denied because the court found Cargile had consented to the search as a 
condition of felony probation and the "officer had reasonable articulable facts to 
expand the traffic stop beyond a traffic violation." (38855 R., p.146.) The district 
court thereafter concluded the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Turek, 
Docket No. 36596, 2011 Opinion No. 8, March 2, 2011, "effectively reversed [the 
district court's] decision that defendant had consented to the search." (lit) As 
such, the district court issued a written order denying Cargile's motion to 
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suppress on the alternative bases that the stop was expanded by Cargile's 
unlawful refusal to exit her vehicle and that her arrest for obstructing an officer 
made the discovery of the contraband inevitable. (38855, R., pp.146-151.) 
Cargile entered a conditional guilty plea to possession with intent, 
reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress and the matter 
was set for sentencing. (38855 R., pp.123-124; 11/4/10 Tr., p.3, L.20 - p.10, 
L.?1.) 
Cargile was on probation for possession of a controlled substance at the 
time she committed the new offense of possession with intent to deliver and 
subsequently admitted to probation violations in that case. (11/8/10 Tr., pp.4-18.) 
The district court set disposition in that matter for the day after her sentencing in 
the new possession with intent to deliver case. (11/08/10 Tr., p.19, Ls.2-13.) 
Cargile remained in custody in both cases but was granted a brief, one-day 
furlough to attend to property issues outside of the jail. (38855 R., pp.128-129.) 
Cargile failed to return to jail after her furlough and instead traveled out of state 
but was ultimately arrested on warrants in northern Idaho. (PSI, pp.10-11.) The 
state then charged her with escape. (38868 R., pp.20-21.) 
The court sentenced Cargile to four years fixed followed by nine years 
indeterminate for possession with intent to deliver. (38855 R., pp.158-162.) The 
district court revoked Cargile's probation and imposed her underlying sentence of 
one year followed by four years indeterminate in the probation case. (38867 R., 
pp.230-232.) Upon her plea of guilty to escape, the court sentenced Cargile to a 
1 Because there were multiple transcripts prepared for this appeal, they will be 
cited to by hearing date. 
2 
period of one year fixed followed by three years indeterminate to be served 
consecutively to the possession with intent to deliver sentence. (38868 R., pp.38-
41.) 




Cargile states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Cargile's suppression 
motion because when Deputy Vogt approached Ms. Cargile's vehicle, 
for a second time, and demanded that she exit her vehicle, he had 
abandoned the purposes of the traffic stop, thereby unreasonably 
extending the stop beyond the original purpose? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Cargile's 
probation and executed the underlying sentence of five years, with one 
year fixed? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Ms. 
Cargile a unified sentence of four, with one year fixed, following her 
guilty plea to escape? 
(Appellant's brief, p.9.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Cargile failed to show error in the denial of her motion to suppress? 
2. Has Cargile failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the execution of 
her underlying sentence upon the revocation of her probation? 
3. Has Cargile failed to show an abuse of discretion in the imposition of one 
year fixed followed by three years indeterminate following her plea of 




Cargile Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To Suppress 
A Introduction 
Cargile challenges the denial of her motion to suppress, contending that 
"[l]aw enforcement unreasonably extended the traffic stop lawfully [sic] extended 
the stop of Ms. Cargile." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Cargile's argument fails. A 
review of the applicable law, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, 
and the district court's factual findings and conclusions of law supports the district 
court's conclusion that 
1) The traffic stop was not expanded before reasons to arrest and 
to search were developed; 2) there are specific and articulable 
facts of criminal activity, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, to support an intrusion beyond the reasonable 
scope of a traffic stop; and 3) the evidence would have been 
obtained in any event under the inevitable discovery doctrine[.] 
(38855 R., p.150.) The district court correctly denied Cargile's motion to 
suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts." State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). The power to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw 
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factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 
P .2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any 
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence. State v. 
Brauch, 133 Idaho 215,218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999). 
C. The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding 
That The Reason For The Traffic Stop Was Not Unlawfully Expanded 
It is well-settled that the stop of a vehicle constitutes an investigative 
detention subject to Fourth Amendment requirements and is "analyzed under the 
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(1968)." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citations omitted). It is also well-settled that law enforcement may deploy 
a drug dog to sniff the exterior of a lawfully stopped vehicle without suspicion of 
drug activity so long as doing so does not prolong the detention beyond what is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405 (2005); State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183-84, 125 P.3d 536, 539-40 
(Ct. App. 2005); State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct. 
App. 2000). "There is no rigid time limit for determining when a detention has 
lasted longer than necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the 
detention and the law enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the 
duration of the stop." Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496, 198 P.3d at 134 (citations 
omitted). The court must also consider whether the officer's observations during 
the encounter "and events succeeding the stop" gave rise to "legitimate reasons 
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\ 
for particularized lines of inquiry and further investigation" which justified 
expanding the investigation to other possible crimes. .!fl; see also State v. 
Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916, 42 P.3d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
Cargile does not challenge the legality of her initial detention; rather, she 
contends that the "officers improperly extended their stop beyond the purpose of 
issuing a citation for failing to use her turn signal." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) 
Application of the correct legal standards to the evidence presented at the 
suppression hearing shows Cargile's argument fails. 
The district court, after hearing the evidence presented, concluded on the 
record that there was reasonable articulable suspicion to enlarge the traffic stop 
based on the training and experience of Officer Vogt combined with his 
observations of Cargile. (10/28/10 Tr., p.114, Ls.10-20.) In its subsequent 
written order2, the district court developed two additional bases for the denial of 
Cargile's motion to suppress: the lack of an expansion of a traffic stop and 
inevitable discovery. (38855 R., pp.146-151.) 
2 In its initial ruling, the district court found the search of Cargile's car was 
permitted by the officer's reasonable articulable suspicion coupled with her 4th 
Amendment waiver. (See, generally. 10/28/10 Tr., pp.107-115.) The district court 
found the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Turek "effectively reversed" 
its finding "that defendant had consented to the search." (38855 R., p.146.) The 
state believes Turek is distinguishable from the facts in this case wherein there 
existed an actual 4th Amendment waiver from an active felony probation. (38867 
R., pp.81-88, 94-101, 145-148.) In addition, a probation search is justified by 
reasonable suspicion regardless of waiver. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 
112 (2001); State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 487-88, 95 P.3d 635, 638-39 
(2004). Thus, the state submits that the district court's initial conclusion this was 
a proper probation search was correct. 
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As he testified at the suppression hearing, Officer's Vogt's experience in 
detecting drug use and observing individuals involved with drugs and the drug 
trade is vast: 
A. [Vogt] As far as training, I have my intermediate certificate 
with POST. I've been to numerous narcotic investigative courses to 
include an 80-hour DEA investigator's course. I'm also certified 
through the DEA, Drug Enforcement Administration, as a 
clandestine lab specialist dismantling, identifying meth labs. 
Several drug interdiction courses that I've gone through, probably 
two or three of those courses, anywhere from a three- to five-day 
course and numerous other investigative course [sic]. 
Q. [attorney for the state] So in addition to your training as a patrol 
officer, do you receive additional training for narcotics investigation 
and detection? 
A. Yes; I have. 
Q. Does that include learning to recognize signs and symptoms 
of narcotic use -
A. Yes; it is. 
Q. -- in individuals? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You have some unique experience, too, don't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Tell me about your experience and about how long you've 
been in law enforcement total. 
A. I've been in law enforcement approximately 13 years. Of 
that time, prior to starting my action assignment about two years 
ago, I was a narcotics detective with the Sheriff's office for 
approximately four years. 
During that time, I, you know, worked in numerous 
undercover cases where me, myself, went out and purchased 
narcotics under controlled, you know, environment, so I've bought 
it. I've seen it bought both covering other undercover officers. I've 
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seen the behaviors of people that are there to deliver their 
narcotics, and so it's kind of a unique situation where I've bought it 
and seen it bought countless times during that time. 
Q. So you play both sides of this ball? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you understand how that particular world works? 
A. Yes; I do. 
Q. Have you ever been with someone that was dealing 
controlled substances when they observed law enforcement? 
A. Yes; I have. 
Q. Can you describe for me the mannerisms or demeanor that 
you've observed through your experience with someone who's 
dealing drugs when they see police officers? 
A. There's numerous times while working in the undercover 
capacity where I would be with a person that was there to sell me 
drugs in parking lots of stores, K-marts, Shop-Kos [sic], Walmarts 
[sic], various places, and it's not uncommon for just, I guess, dumb 
luck, for you know, other uninvolved patrol officers, not knowing 
what's going on, will sometimes drive through the parking lot, will 
sometimes conduct an uninvolved traffic stop near the area, and so 
I've been in those vehicles with, either in my vehicle or in their 
vehicle, when the person that was selling me the drugs spotted the 
police officers, and so I've seen their demeanor change, their 
attention change. It's kind of an unnerving, scary moment for me at 
that point because I don't what's going on in their mind when they 
see the police, so I have seen their body language change, the way 
they look, the way they don't look, what they say, what they don't 
say. It's just a unique thing to see. 
(10/28/10 Tr., p.53, L.16-p.56, L.8.) 
As specifically relating to his interaction with Cargile, Officer Vogt 
observed the following behavior when he attempted to perform a traffic stop of 
her vehicle: 
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But the behaviors that I saw with Ms. Cargile were different than 
those in my experience than those normal human behaviors when 
the police are behind him [sic]. The way she didn't look at me, but 
looking at me out of the corner of her eyes, you know, things like 
that caught my attention. 
It appeared to me she was trying to act like she didn't see me. 
Again looking out of the corner of her eye. You can see a little 
head movement, you know, but not a full look into the mirror, so I 
saw that slight head movement, and again it looked to me like 
looking at [sic] the corner of her eye and not yielding to my lights for 
probably a good quarter of a mile, which that, you know, seemed 
suspicious to me. 
(10/28/10 Tr., p.63, L.1 - p.64, L.7.) Officer Vogt also noted once Cargile did 
yield to his lights, she pulled into the center lane instead of pulling to the right and 
eventually crossed through traffic to park in a marked space in a business 
parking lot. (See, generally, 10/28/10 Tr., p.64, L.23 - p.68, L.22.) Cargile's 
demeanor was consistent with Officer Vogt's experience with suspects dealing in 
narcotics as she "appeared to be stalling" and was attempting to get the officer 
"away from the public's view." (10/28/10 Tr., p.67, L.23 - p.68, L.12.) While 
Officer Vogt was running Cargile's registration and checking the status of her 
driver's license and record, another officer with a drug dog arrived on scene. 
(10/28/10 Tr., p.71, L.3 - p.73, L.2.) Officer Vogt then approached Cargile with 
the other officer and asked her to step out of her vehicle to talk to her about the 
reason for the traffic stop. (10/28/10 Tr., p. 73, Ls.3-8.) Cargile refused to get 
out of her vehicle, thus lengthening the time of the original stop. (10/28/10 Tr., 
p.73, Ls.9-19.) As testified to at the hearing on the motion to suppress, the time 
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from initiation of the traffic stop to the time when Cargile's own actions caused 
the officers to remove her from her vehicle was approximately eight minutes. 
(10/28/10 Tr., p.76, L.1 -p.80, L.20.) 
Consistent with the testimony, the district court found made the following 
findings of fact: 
Around 7:30 p.m., June 23, 2011 Ada County Sherriff 
Deputy Vogt, an experienced narcotics detective, was patrolling the 
area of Five Mile and Overland in Boise, Idaho when he observed 
defendant Sandee Cargille [sic] fail to use her turn signal. He then 
followed her for about two miles, during which he contacted Deputy 
Piccola, a canine handler who is part of his team, for assistance, as 
a matter of routine and also because he was becoming suspicious 
of Cargille's [sic] behavior, primarily because of the way she looked 
at him and the way she didn't look at him. After about two miles 
and positioned directly behind Cargille [sic], he activated his red 
and blue emergency lights[.] He noticed that she looked out of the 
corner of her eye in the driver's side mirror at him. She did not pull 
over but continued to drive for about a quarter of a mile, and it 
appeared to him that she was acting as though she did not see him. 
He saw a little head movement, but not a full look into the mirror. It 
looked like she was looking out of the corner of her eye and not 
yielding. After a quarter of a mile, he then activated his siren a 
couple of times to get her attention. She then looked directly into 
the rearview mirror at the officer. Instead of pulling over to the right 
hand side of the road, she drove into the center turn lane. Vogt 
though that was odd, because in his numerous traffic stops a 
person will pull over to the far right hand lane. She then crossed 
traffic onto the other side of the road and then pulled into a large 
parking lot of a business. Instead of stopping, she continued to 
drive very slowly to the rear of the parking lot behind some 
buildings. Vogt found all this traffic and parking pattern to be 
unusual. Additionally he was becoming concerned about his safety 
because of the stop behind buildings and out of public view. After 
Cargille [sic] stopped, he approached her and obtained her driver's 
information. He returned to his car to run checks and found some 
past drug offenses. Within about five minutes of the stop, Deputy 
Picolla [sic] arrived with the canine. Vogt brought Picolla [sic] up to 
speed. The intent was that while Picolla [sic] ran the canine around 
the vehicle, Vogt would finish up the traffic stop. Within eight 
minutes of the stop, Vogt returned to Cargille [sic] to tell her about 
her turn signal and the reason for the stop. He asked her to step 
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out of the car. She refused, saying it was her right to stay in the 
car. He asked several times and she said "no". He then told her he 
had a drug dog here and she needed to step out of the truck so he 
could safely run the dog and if she refused she would be arrested. 
She again said "No." After several times of refusing to exit, Vogt 
verbally told her she was under arrest. She then quickly leaned 
over and locked the driver's door. The window was still open so 
Vogt reached through the open window and controlled Cargille's 
[sic] arms behind her back while Picolla [sic] unlocked the 
passenger door, reached for Cargille [sic], moving personal items 
out of the way and some onto the ground in the process. After 
Cargille [sic] was removed, the canine alerted to items on the 
ground and in the vehicle. Cargille [sic] was charged with resisting 
and obstructing, possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
Vogt also testified that had the dog not alerted, an inventory 
search of Cargille's [sic] vehicle would have ensued pursuant to 
their inventory procedures. 
(38855 R., pp.147-148.) 
Cargile claims on appeal the officer had abandoned the initial purpose of 
the traffic stop when he requested Cargile exit her vehicle. (Appellant's brief, 
p16.) This claim is not supported by the law, which allows an officer to order a 
driver from a stopped vehicle. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 
301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 
134 (Ct. App. 2008). When Officer Vogt asked Cargile to exit her vehicle so he 
could discuss the reason for the traffic stop, Cargile refused. There is no support 
for Cargile's claim that the traffic stop was impermissibly expanded beyond its 
original purpose when the officer requested she exit her vehicle to talk about her 
failure to use a turn signal. 
However, if this Court were to find an expansion of the traffic stop, as the 
district court correctly determined upon review of the testimony presented at the 
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hearing on the motion to suppress, once Cargile refused the officer's lawful 
request that she exit her vehicle, "things changed and the stop reasonably 
expanded into resisting and obstructing an officer." (38855 R., p.150.) Cargile's 
actions resisting the officers expanded the traffic stop into an arrest for resist and 
obstruct. 
Additionally, the record supports the district court's finding of an additional 
basis permitting expansion of the traffic stop based on the officer's reasonable 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity based on his training and experience and 
his observations of Cargile prior to her yielding to his lights and siren. (38855 R., 
pp.149-150). "These facts permitted a lawful expansion of the purpose of the 
stop because Vogt had specific and articulable facts to warrant further intrusion." 
(38855 R., p.150.) 
Finally, even if the traffic stop had been improperly expanded, a 
subsequent inventory search following a lawful arrest for resisting and 
obstructing officers would have yielded the evidence of drug distribution. Such 
evidence would have been admissible at trial based on the inevitable discovery 
doctrine. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (Under the inevitable 
discovery doctrine the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence found by 
improper methods if the preponderance of the evidence establishes that the 
evidence inevitably would have been found by lawful means.); Stuart v. State, 
136 Idaho 490, 496, 36 P.3d 1278, 1284 (2001) (The inevitable discovery 
doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule.). Cargile claims on appeal the 
state failed to show how the evidence obtained in the search was "untainted," 
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thereby failing to meet its burden and requiring the suppression of the evidence 
as "fruit of the illegal police activity." (Appellant's brief, p.17.) Cargile ignores, 
however, the district court's finding that the state had met this burden at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress: 
Here, even if the search was illegal, Vogt had probable cause to 
arrest Cargille [sic] for resisting and obstructing. Had the drug dog 
not alerted, the controlled substance and paraphernalia would have 
been discovered pursuant to a valid inventory search. 
38855 R., p.150.) Cargile does not challenge this finding on appeal. 
The district court's conclusion in this case, that the traffic stop was not 
unreasonably expanded beyond the original scope of the traffic stop based on 
the officer's observations of Cargile in light of his training and experience, is 
supported by substantial evidence and is consistent with the applicable legal 
standards. Cargile has failed to establish otherwise. As such, she has failed to 
meet her burden of showing error in the district court's order denying her motion 
to suppress. 
II. 
Cargile Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion By Imposing Her Underlying Sentence After Revoking Her Probation 
A. Introduction 
After finding that Cargile violated her probation based on her admissions, 
including the commission of new offenses, the district court set Cargile's 
disposition for a date subsequent to the sentencing on her new felony charge. 
(11/08/10 Tr., pp.9-19.) In the interim, Cargile was granted a brief furlough to 
attend to some property issues outside the jail but failed to return to jail, instead 
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traveling to Washington and ultimately being recovered in northern Idaho by law 
enforcement. (5/19/11 Tr., p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.25.) When finally before the 
court for disposition on the probation violation, the district court revoked Cargile's 
probation and ordered her sentence executed. (5/27/2011 Tr., p.8, Ls.22-23.) 
Although Cargile "does not dispute the district court's decision to revoke 
probation," it is her position on appeal "that the district court should have sua 
sponte reduced her sentence." (Appellant's brief, p.18.) 
Cargile's argument fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v. 
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378,381,870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
C. Cargile Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Revoking Her Probation 
A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on 
appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion. State v. Lafferty, 
125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994). An abuse of 
discretion cannot be found if the district court's decision was consistent with 
applicable legal standards, and was reached by an exercise of reason. kl 
"The purpose of probation is rehabilitation." State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho 506, 510, 
903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995). "In deciding whether revocation of probation is 
the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether the probation 
is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is 
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consistent with protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 
P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001). Any cause satisfactory to the court, which 
indicates that probation is not meeting its goals, is sufficient to justify revocation. 
Wilson, 127 Idaho at 510, 903 P.2d at 99. 
Cargile claims the "district court did not give proper weight to her remorse 
and desire to change her ways" in failing to reduce her sentence. (Appellant's 
brief, p.19.) The record, however, supports the district court's sentencing 
determination and Cargile's position on appeal is contrary to that at the 
disposition hearing wherein she requested imposition of her underlying sentence: 
"Your Honor, at this time we are just asking the Court to go ahead and impose 
her sentence at this time." (5/27/11 Tr., p.4, Ls.3-5.) Cargile was "looking 
forward to getting treatment in a setting where she has been sentenced to" in her 
other case. (5/27/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.2-3.) 
Cargile has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the court's 
determination to revoke probation and impose her underlying sentence of one 
year fixed followed by four years indeterminate with credit for the 499 days 




Cargile Has Failed To Establish An Abuse In Sentencing In The Imposition Of 
One Year Fixed Followed By Three Years Indeterminate Upon Her Plea Of Guilty 
To Escape 
A. Introduction 
Cargile asserts that given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of 
one year fixed followed by three years indeterminate following her plea of guilty 
to the crime of escape is excessive. (Appellant's brief, p.20.) Cargile has failed 
to meet her burden in establishing the district court abused its discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for a abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). 
C. Cargile Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Discretion 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of sentencing discretion, 
the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the 
sentence is excessive. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. To establish 
that the sentence is excessive, Cargile must demonstrate that reasonable minds 
could not conclude the sentence is appropriate to accomplish the sentencing 
goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. lg_,_ Idaho 
appellate courts presume that the fixed portion of a sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 
P.2d 552 (1999). 
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Cargile argues on appeal that because she apologized to the court at 
sentencing and was remorseful and ready to change her ways at her probation 
violation disposition hearing, the court abused its discretion. (Appellant's brief, 
p.21.) The district court sentenced Cargile to a period of four years fixed 
followed by nine years indeterminate for the possession with intent to deliver. 
(5/26/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.12-16.) The escape charge at issue in this claim of abuse 
of discretion at sentencing arose from Cargile's fleeing the state after obtaining a 
brief furlough following her conditional plea of guilty to the drug charge. The 
district court imposed a four year sentence with the first year fixed to be served 
consecutively to the possession with intent charge with a recommendation of 
placement in the therapeutic community program after considering Cargile's 
criminal history and the information before the court. (5/26/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.12-
19.) 
Cargile was on probation for possession of a controlled substance when 
she received the possession with intent to deliver charge. (PSI, p.10.) She had 
pied guilty to the new charge and admitted probation violations in the old charge 
when she failed to return to jail following a furlough and traveled out of state. 
(Id.) It was only after she was arrested on outstanding warrants and returned to 
court that she was charged with this escape. She apparently justifies her escape 
by pointing to her business plan to sell methamphetamine to pay for land she 
wanted in Washington. (PSI, p.11.) As the presentence investigator pointed out, 
"it is obvious [Cargile] has not changed her pattern of criminal thinking." (Id.) 
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Cargile has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in 
imposing a sentence of one year fixed followed by three years indeterminate for 
escape. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
denial of Cargile's motion to suppress. Additionally, the state requests this Court 
affirm the revocation of Cargile's probation and the imposition of her original 
sentence in her underlying possession of controlled substance charge as well as 
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